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FOREWORD
FREEDOM FROM CONTRACT

OMRI BEN-SHAHAR*

This Symposium explores freedom from contract. When I was
preparing to travel from my home in Ann Arbor to the University of
Wisconsin where this Symposium was to be held, my 9-year-old son
asked where I was headed. I explained that a bunch of people and I
were going to meet and talk about freedom from contract, but the boy
seemed unsure what this exchange was going to be about. I tried to
translate: "It is about making promises that you don't really have to
keep." This sounded surprising to him. He raised an inquisitive brow,
and I knew he was wondering: "How come I never encountered this
species of promises? What are those wonderful promises that you-don'treally-have-to-keep?"
My mind was searching for a way to convey the nuance.
"Remember our agreement two weeks ago in which you promised to
start helping with dinner preparation by being in charge of setting the
table? You made a promise, but I don't recall that you actually have
been setting the table every night since. So here you go, a promise that
you-don't-really-have-to-keep! " "We never said that I had to do it every
night," the 9-year-old protested. "But we also never said that you don't
have to do it at all," I responded. "Sometimes people are serious but
other times they unsure about their intent, and it may be hard to know
exactly what they mean and whether they truly intend to keep the
promise."
At that moment, I recognized that I was describing to my son only
one dimension of the freedom from contract problem, the dimension that
involves freedom from preliminary agreements, or, more generally,
from incomplete contracts-from bargains that were sketched out but
never fully concluded. When the promise is only roughly outlined, is it
binding? Should it be binding when the parties reached some, perhaps
substantial, understanding and agreed to continue to "negotiate" the
remaining details? These issues are explored from various directions by
several of the articles in this Symposium.
My son, I imagined at that moment, was possibly thinking to
himself something along the following lines: "little does Dad know that I
never intended in the first place to help with setting the table, definitely
not with any regularity .

. . ."

This narrative, too, I realized, is a
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freedom-from-promise subtext, often referred to as "promissory fraud":
the making of a promise with the intent not to keep it. What should be
the legal consequences of a promise that was made under such
circumstances? Does it matter if the fraudulent promise was
subsequently breached? This issue is the focus of another article in this
Symposium.
But sneaky motives are not merely the prerogative of an
opportunistic 9-year-old. While he made his promise envisioning one
pragmatic scenario (that of nonperformance), I recalled during my
conversation with him what I was thinking to myself two weeks earlier,
at the time the original bargain was enacted: "little does my son know
that the actual regularity of his obligation will eventually be dictated by
his parents, over the course of the following weeks." In other words,
my own subtext was: let him take the bait; the real terms of the promise
are "wrapped," to be revealed after the deal was struck. It is the
parent-the drafter-in-control-who will determine those details.
Several of the contributions to this Symposium will explore this major
contemporary problem: the freedom that promisors have (and often
don't have) from such "terms in the box"-shrinkwrapped terms that are
revealed post-assent.
When I conveyed this exchange to my wife, it turned out that her
understanding of our son's promise was yet different than either his or
mine. "Of course the promise he made is not binding," she enlightened
me. "The whole purpose of the agreement was to induce the boy to
voluntarily contribute to the family effort. If we were to enforce it, or
to dictate the fine terms, this would undermine his own self-imposed
motivation and responsibility." Freedom from contract, in other words,
especially the immunity from formal sanctions, can breed other more
informal norms of behavior, emerging from individuals' sense of
fairness, dignity, and trust. This theme is developed and applied in
another important contribution to this Symposium.
Eventually, I made it to Madison, Wisconsin, and spent three days
with a group of contracts scholars and law review editors, exploring
these and related ideas. This Symposium issue of the Wisconsin Law
Review brings together various new thoughts and perspectives on when
and why liability might arise in the absence of affirmative assent. It
provides doctrinal and conceptual explorations, as well economic,
political, and philosophical inquiries into the problem of drawing the
optimal boundary of freedomfrom contractual obligation.
In the remaining parts of this Foreword, I will briefly sketch the
scope of the conference and provide a few references to the state-ofknowledge prior to this conference.
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What is Freedomfrom Contract?
This Symposium revisits the "second" contractual freedom, the
freedom from contractual liability. A contract that forms upon mutual
assent-upon the bilateral manifestation of consensus over its termsaccords each party an opportunity to exercise the "first" contractual
freedom, the freedom of contract, that is, the freedom to design the
terms of trade. This is the power to create obligations that promote
one's interests, the power to harness others people's efforts to the
pursuit of one's affairs. But since there are two parties and thus two
competing sets of affairs that need to be aligned, the process of
bargaining over an agreement and negotiating its provisions is often
complex. Having entered into this negotiation process, or even accepted
some partial performance, how free are the parties to withdraw? How
Can the parties make
free are they from contractual liability?
representations that are not legally enforceable? Are they free from
Should the law
obligations that were not expressly negotiated?
accommodate "regret"?
Like the primary contractual obligations, the parties can potentially
stipulate the answers to these issues; determine their own precontractual
duties; and the legal consequences of various negotiation and contracting
strategies. But in the absence of privately designated protocols, it is up
to the law to determine the freedom to withdraw from contractual
obligations.
And the law, indeed, has been active in regulating these questions.
It was once thought that prior to the manifestation of express mutual
assent-prior to the narrowing down of the deal to a definitive set of
terms-parties are free to walk away, wholly unburdened by any
The contract versus no-contract
contractual or residual liability.
boundary was the threshold between full expectation liability and zero
liability and was crossed only when both parties made explicit objective
statements of commitment that manifested consensus.' In particular,
provisions not assented to affirmatively were not part of the contract;
agreements now to agree later created no liability; silence and
nonrejection could not be construed as acceptance. But this view has
been reformed in many ways. As Professor Charles Knapp and others
have recognized in the past, the law imposes on negotiating parties a
variety of obligations that have limited the freedom to abandon
negotiations and the freedom from contract. 2 Explicit assent is not
1.
See, e.g., E. Allan Farnsworth, PrecontractualLiability and Preliminary
Agreements: Fair Dealings and Failed Negotiations, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 217, 221

(1987).
2.

Nili Cohen, Pre-ContractualDuties: Two Freedoms and the Contract to

Negotiate, in GOOD FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAW

25 (J. Beatson & D.
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required for the majority of contractual provisions, which can be
supplemented by statutory gap fillers.3 And the law is much more
lenient in enforcing terms drafted be one party, accepted by the other's
passive conduct of nonrejection. 4
Some of these limitations on freedom from obligation may be selfimposed. For example, an offeror may restrict his power to revoke an
otherwise revocable offer.5 This, too, was once thought to be a "legal
impossibility," as such a commitment to the negotiation process-such
waiver of the freedom from contract-was perceived to be one-sided and
lacking consideration. 6 Or a party may promise, at the outset of the
negotiations, to pay a lock-up or a breakup fee in the event that he
decides not to enter into an agreement. Similarly, parties may limit
their freedom from contract by adopting negotiation practices that do not
require affirmative acceptance, but instead deem offers to be accepted
unless expressly rejected (that is, accepted by silence). But these
intentional restrictions on the freedom to walk do not represent a
diminished freedom from contract any more than say, an agreement to
sell one's property diminishes one's property rights. On the contrary,
the fact that parties can trade away their freedom from contract via an
intentional private precontractual arrangement suggests that this freedom
would otherwise be substantial and unrestricted.
More interestingly, restrictions on the freedom of negotiations and
from terms not explicitly assented to are increasingly imposed by the
law as a matter of default arrangement, and often even in an immutable
manner. Most notable, perhaps, is the active role that contract law
assumes in filling gaps in the agreement. Agreements that lack basic
terms, such as price, duration and terms of payment, can now be
enforced with the aid of gap fillers. 7 Without such statutory gap fillers,
explicit agreement would have been required for the parties to be bound.
But with the diminishing requirement for explicit consent, parties may
find themselves liable before they actually agreed on many of the
contract's provisions, some of which they may have hoped to further
negotiate in the course of their relationship. The freedom that they once
had, to walk away any time before they consented to all the basic terms,
has eroded with the rise of majoritarian gap fillers.

Friedman, eds., 1995); Charles L. Knapp, Enforcing the Contract to Bargain, 44
N.Y.U. L. REV. 673 (1969); Richard E. Speidel, The New Spirit of Contract, 2 J.L. &
COMM. 193 (1982).
3.
U.C.C. § 2-305 (2003).

4.

See, e.g., ProCD v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).

5.

U.C.C. § 2-205.

6.

See, e.g., Dickinson v. Dodds, 2 Ch. D. 463 (1876); see also C.C.

LANGDELL, A SUMMARY OF THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 178 (1880).
7.
RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33 (1981); U.C.C. § 2-204(3).
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In the gap-filling case, freedom from contract is weakened because
parties may find themselves under obligation that they never
affirmatively assumed. A similar problem, and another restriction on
freedom from contract, arises when parties find themselves bound to
terms that were expressly drafted, but were either hidden in the shrinkwrapped box or determined at a later stage ("rolling contract").
Determining whether a consumer is bound to these "passively" assentedto terms is an important way in which the law regulates the freedom
from contractual obligation. It is, indeed, a hot topic in contemporary
contracting, the subject of polar division among courts,8 and one that is
only vaguely addressed under the proposed amendment to Article 2.9
Shifting attention to the law of negotiations, the obligation to
negotiate a contract in good faith is another component in the restrictions
on the freedom from contract. Whether or not such an obligation exists
at the start of the negotiations, it is quite clear that it has substantial
weight at the advanced stages of the negotiations. And it may also be
imposed on parties to relational contracts, once their ability to
voluntarily communicate and "regenerate" their obligations is
In a typical case, parties who reach partial
compromised.' 0
understanding over terms and agree to continue negotiate the remaining
issues are obligated to carry out the further negotiations in good faith."'
This means that the power to make and reject proposals is no longer
unconstrained.
While parties cannot be forced to complete the
negotiations, and while bad faith does not ordinarily give rise to
contractual remedies, it does involve a cost-often reliance damages"that are aimed to channel the otherwise reluctant party into a contract.
Some restrictions on the freedom to withdraw from negotiations are
one-sided. There are restrictions that are applicable to offerors only,
by, say, limiting the revocability of certain offers. The most prominent
case in which such an irrevocability presumption applies is a bid by a
8.
Compare Hill v. Gateway 2000, 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding
that terms in the box are binding if the buyer had an opportunity to return the goods
after reading the terms), with Klocek v. Gateway, 104 F. Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000)
(holding that same terms, if material, are not binding unless expressly accepted by the
buyer).
9.
Under amended Section 2-207(b) of the Uniform Commercial Code, terms
drafted by the seller and hidden in the box are binding to the extent that "both parties
agree"-a standard vague enough to permit the array of holdings under the current
Article 2.
10.
Oglebay Norton Co. v. Armco, Inc., 556 N.E.2d 515 (Oh. 1990)
(requiring CEOs of two companies who had a long-term relationship to negotiate and
mediate to fill in the gaps in their agreement.)
11.
See, e.g., Teachers Ins. & Annuity Ass'n of Am. v. Tribune Co., 670 F.
Supp.491 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Copeland v. Baskin Robbins U.S.A., 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 875
(Ct. App. 2002).
12.
Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 26 Wis.2d 683, 133 N.W.2d 267 (1965).
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subcontractor that is relied upon and included in the general contractor's
bid. 3 Such one-sided limitations on the freedom from contract were
perceived in past generations to conflict with the fundamental
requirement of mutuality, or consensus-the notion that unless both
parties are bound, neither is bound. But various developments,
including reform in the doctrine of unilateral contracts and the decline of
the illusory promise concept, have made it increasingly possible to
structure obligations with one sided options, that is, with one-sided
restrictions on withdrawal.14
These doctrines and many others 5 regulate the procedures that
parties may follow during negotiations and their precontractual liability.
But rules governing contract interpretation can also affect the freedom to
negotiate. By assigning legal consequences to representations made
during the negotiations, these rules indirectly restrict the behavior of the
parties and might hold them bound to obligations they did not intend to
create. For example, the traditional rigid parol evidence rule barred
courts from relying on oral representations made between the parties, so
long as they did not amount to fraud. But under more recent and more
lenient approaches, courts can rely on precontractual expressions to
interpret, and often to vary and even trump the explicit terms. 16
However advantageous this interpretive approach might be from an ex
post perspective, it makes it costlier for a negotiating party to
The freedom to employ bargaining
communicate information. 7
strategies while avoiding liability is diminished.
There are, to be sure, various other important legal doctrines that
restrict parties' ability to shed-off contractual liability. This Symposium
will provide a rich description of many additional examples. In the
remaining space, I want to introduce some of the common concerns that
inform the debate over the desirable boundaries of freedom from
contract.

13.

See, e.g., Drennan v. Star Paving, 333 P.2d 755 (Cal. 1958).

14,
See generally, Avery W. Katz, The Efficient Design of Option Contracts:
Principles and Applications (Columbia Sch. of Law, Ctr. for Law and Econ. Studies,
2004),
248,
No.
Paper
Working
http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taabstract-id=5 12146.

15.

available

at

For a comprehensive study of the different grounds of liability prior to a

contract, see Farnsworth, supra note 1.
U.C.C. § 2-202; Hunt Foods & Indus., Inc. v. Doliner, 270 N.Y.S.2d 937
16.
(App. Div. 1996).

17.

1 am grateful to Professor Lisa Bernstein for mentioning this effect of the

parol evidence rule.
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Some TraditionalJustificationsfor Freedomfrom Contract
The rise of precontractual liability has eroded the traditional
precontractual regime of unrestricted freedom from contract. These
developments in the law, while aiming to provide better precontractual
discipline and secure the "integrity" of the negotiation arena, can be
seen as a threat to other social concerns.
First, and perhaps foremost, liability prior to a contract reduces the
power of a party to self-regulate its obligations. If obligations arise
before both parties fully consented to them, the voluntary nature of these
obligations is diminished. The notion that contract is a vehicle for
private, autonomous ordering is founded on principle that contractual
obligations are willed by the parties, and that-in the absence of such
will-no promissory obligations arise. As Charles Fried explains, "the
will theory, which sees contractual obligations as essentially selfimposed, is a fair implication of liberal individualism. '' 8 If an
individual's choice to refrain from a contract is constrained, that is, if an
obligation arises to promote a social, rather than a private concern, the
autonomy of this individual is diminished.
Will theory can remind us what is at stake. It is not, however,
particularly useful in drawing the precise boundaries of the freedom
from contract. Surely, a liberal conception of individual autonomy can
withstand some tailored restrictions on this freedom, if they are
necessary to promote some other social good, including the autonomy of
a relying counterpart. So long as individuals are not bound to enter into
negotiations and are not submitted to arbitrary transfers, the selfimposed nature of contractual and precontractual obligations remains by
and large secure. It is not the institution of private ordering that is
threatened by tailored restrictions on the freedom from contract, nor
private autonomy, but rather the more particular functions of the
market.
How is trade affected by legal regulation of the negotiation process?
Restricting the parties' freedom from contract diminishes the
opportunity of an individual to freely walk away from negotiations. This
added cost could potentially chill the incentives of the parties to enter the
negotiations in the first place. 9 Relative to a world in which, at any
time prior to mutual assent, parties are free to exit the negotiations, the
increase in precontractual liability consequences would caution parties to
think twice before launching into negotiations or before entering into
18.

CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL

OBLIGATION 2 (1981).
19.
See 1 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 361 (2d ed.
1998) (discussing precontractual liability having "a chilling effect" of discouraging
parties from entering negotiations).
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contemporaneous bilateral negotiations with multiple parties, and thus
reduce the frequency and the ease of negotiations. This, in turn, is
undesirable because some opportunities for mutually beneficial trade can
be squandered.
Another way to view the chilling effect of liability is to recognize
that when the law steps in and establishes legally enforceable obligations
on the negotiating parties, other sources of obligations might be crowded
out. If, by law, the freedom of a party to reject a contract is restricted,
there is less to be determined by voluntary assent. Accordingly, trustbased mechanisms for the creation of obligations would be substituted
by legal sanctions. The propensity to rely on informal and cooperative
resolutions would naturally diminish.
The chilling effect highlights an ex ante distortion. It suggests that
parties who anticipate the "trap" of reduced freedom from contract
liability would exert greater caution in deciding to enter negotiations.
But the reduced freedom from contract can also have a distortive effect
ex post, after the parties already entered negotiations. At this stage,
even a party who entered the negotiations with a sincere desire to
transact may eventually prefer to refrain from transaction. Perhaps he
discovered that other opportunities are more worthy; or that this
transaction involves costs that were not previously anticipated; or he
may simply acquire distaste towards the counterpart. When the freedom
from contract is constrained, the flexibility that would otherwise exist to
"skip" partners would diminish. As a result, parties may be stuck with
unwanted transactions. The ability to enter better, more efficient, deals
would decline.
Finally, a regime of freedom from contract is advantageous because
it provides a simple and certain landmark for the initiation of liability.
Liability arises only when the parties formally manifest mutual assent,
and not beforehand. This provides the negotiating parties with added
certainty, as they can better identify the moment in which they become
liable. Freedom from contract, implying the absence of precontractual
liability, is an aspect of the basic all-or-nothing feature of contractual
liability: there is full liability once consensus is manifested, but there is
no liability otherwise. If liability-however measured-can arise prior
to mutual assent, the boundaries are less clear and the parties might need
more legal advice to recognize the legal consequences of their
negotiating tactics.
Why Might It Be Desirable to Limit the Freedomfrom Contract?
The answers to this question are, of course, the topic of this
symposium, and thus it would be presumptuous on my part to
summarize in the remaining page of the Forward the many
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considerations on which such answers rely. Still, it might be useful to
sketch the starting point for this symposium-the interests that may be
advanced by tailored restriction on the freedom from contract.
Often, parties waive the banner of freedom from contract
deviously, to masquerade what is otherwise plain opportunistic regret.
Something changed-prices went up, new bidders came by, the deal
doesn't look so good after all-such that a retracting party may seek to
recapture an opportunity he gave up previously, when making a
promise. Thus, for example, a party who made a firm offer in the hope
of attracting attention from the offeree may seek to revoke it when a
better deal was proposed by a third party. 20 Here, limiting the ex post
freedom from contract is the obvious flip side of respecting parties' ex
ante freedom to contract: it is only their own self-imposed obligations,
to which the parties wanted to be bound, that are binding.
Other concerns may also be prominent in limiting the freedom from
contract, even when opportunism is not present. Protection of the
reliance interest is, of course, one such principle concern, which has
served as the foundation for a variety of freedom-restricting doctrines.
For example, Section 87(2) of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts
talks about offers which, by virtue of being relied upon, can be binding
"to the extent necessary to avoid injustice." Or, in franchise and
distributorship agreements, the power of the franchisor to terminate the
agreement (or to refuse renewal) can be limited to the extent that the
franchisee or distributor has made specific reliance investments that, but
for renewal, would be forfeited. 2 Here, a relational contract that would
otherwise be terminable at-will cannot be dissolved prior to recovery of
the specific investments. More generally, the freedom of contracting
parties to cancel deals and terminate on-going relationships-however
broad it might be in law and
in practice-is often restricted by liability
22
for forfeited reliance costs.
Limiting the freedom from contract, in the form of aggressive gap
filling in indefinite contracts, can be the upshot of specific policies
aimed at instilling particular terms and practices into a class of
relationships. Thus, for example, agreements with open quantity terms,
which were deemed in the past to lack mutuality, 23 now exhibit less
freedom from contract, once it was understood that some types of
20.
See, e.g., Petterson v. Pattberg, 161 N.E. 428 (N.Y. 1928)
21.
See, e.g., Bak-A-Lum Corp. of Am. v. ALCOA Bldg. Prods., Inc., 351
A.2d 349 (N.J. 1976) (holding that even a distributorship arrangement cannot be
terminated if that would destroy the franchisee's ability to recoup investments).
22.
Stewart Macaulay, The Standardized Contracts of United States Automobile
Manufacturers, 3-21 INT'L ENCYCLOPEDIA CoMP. L. 18 (1974).
23.
E.g., Wickham & Burton Coal Co. v. Farmers' Lumber Co., 179 N.W.
417 (Iowa 1920) (a requirements contract not enforceable because it did not bind the
buyer to buy a minimum quantity).
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transactions require a flexible quantity arrangement. Different types of
transactions in different industries, or between parties of varying
sophistication, might therefore require different magnitudes and content
of supplementation, namely, a quicker entry into the domain of
contractual liability. And similarly with respect to exit from contractual
obligation: what events constitute impossibility or impracticability (and
free the obligor from liability) could well depend on the type of
transaction and the industry norms.'
Finally, limiting the freedom from contract means that agreements
and promises may be enforceable even if pronounced in less than
complete and formal manner, as in the absence of affirmative
manifestation of acceptance. There could be good reasons to enable
parties to be bound even when their affirmation of intent is passive or
incomplete, mostly having to do with saving of transactions and
contracting costs.2 Surely, there are counter-concerns with the content
of passively or irrationally accepted terms. Indeed, regulation of
specific markets, particularly credit markets, often provides enhanced
protection of consumers' freedom from contract by, say, regulating an
immutable right to cancel the contract within a specified period. 26 It is
sometimes questionable whether freedom from such passive contracts
would solve the problem of coercive terms, or rather have the sole effect
of forcing the parties to waste more resources on explicit contract
formation. These issues will be explored by several of the contributors
to this Symposium.
Returning, then, to the basic query, can parties, at the course of
negotiations, make promises to which they do not intend to be bound?
The answer is: not without cost. These costs, however, represent a
synthesis of various conflicting interests and concerns, which we shall
now turn to study in more detail.

24.
Indeed, the landmark case of Taylor v. Caldwell, 122 Eng. Rep. 309
(1863), distinguishes between personal service promises and services for which there are
identical substitutes
25.
See, e.g., James J. White, Autistic Contracts, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 1693

(2000).
See, e.g., 16 C.F.R. § 429.1 (2003) (requiring door-to-door sellers to
26.
provide the buyer a cancellation form entitling her to cancel the transaction within three

days).

